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A Human Rights Approach to Risk: 
The Case of Human Germline Editing 
BY JESSICA ALMQVIST* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The new human genome editing tools (CRISPR) have the potential 
of improving the protection of the human right to health.1 Not only can 
these tools be used to treat and cure diseases, such as cancer or diabetes; 
in the future, they may also be used to prevent genetic and other diseases 
and disorders in offspring. In this light, the tools have the potential to 
prevent human suffering, which is a core concern in international human 
rights law.2 However, clinical applications of these new tools pose several 
risks of harm. When it comes to modifications of human somatic cells, 
these risks are limited to the patient undergoing the treatment.3 In the case 
of human germline editing, the risks are not so limited since the effects 
are inheritable and can be passed onto future generations.4 There is cur-
rently a great deal of scientific uncertainty about the actual biological 
consequences of human germline editing not only for the offspring whose 
genome has been modified, but also future generations. A key question 
that arises is how to manage risk in this kind of scenario. 
This article will center on the question of how to manage risks posed 
by human germline editing, including for the purpose of permitting ge-
netic modifications of future offspring. As will be explained, interna-
tional law entails a series of legal obligations, including in the area of 
human rights, that frames and constrains regulatory decisions on how to 
 
* Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Law Faculty, Lund University. The author 
wishes to thank the editors of the Journal and especially the Editor-in-Chief, Saphya Council, for 
outstanding work. 
 1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 2. Roberto Adorno and Cristiana Baffone, Human Rights and the Moral Obligation to Alle-
viate Suffering, SUFFERING AND BIOETHICS (Ronald M. Green and Nathan J. Palpant eds., 2014).   
 3. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, 
AND GOVERNANCE 83 (The Nat’l Acads. Press ed., 2017). 
 4. Id. at 111–12. 
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respond to the risks posed by clinical human germline editing. Since these 
obligations protect different interests, some of which are in direct com-
petition with one another, there is a need for balancing these interests and 
obligations. While difficult decisions must be made, the idea of ‘side-
stepping’ some interest that a state is legally obliged to protect will not 
be a satisfactory response and is incompatible with international law. 
Part II will explain how risk assessment and management has come 
to be integrated into international law in the form of legal obligations 
placed on states to act with due diligence and precaution. Part III will 
discuss the role of the “precautionary principle” in responding to risk sce-
narios. In this context, this article will highlight the contributions and 
shortcomings of this principle. This article will stress a basic problem that 
arises where the principle leaves the door open for different interpreta-
tions, some of which ignore existing human rights obligations. Part IV 
will identify several rights that come under pressure by sweeping bans of 
clinical human germline editing. Part IV argues that such bans downplay 
the benefits of continued scientific research for the progressive realiza-
tion and fulfillment of the human right to health. This article will further 
argue that the bans also ignore the rights to science and to scientific free-
dom. In conclusion, any reasonable response to the challenges and op-
portunities posed by future clinical applications of CRISPR must con-
sider not only state obligations of due diligence and precaution, but also 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill these rights. The focus on these 
interests and obligations does not preclude that there may be additional 
interests and obligations to take into account, including equality and non-
discrimination.5 
II.  RISK ASSESSMENT AS A DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATION 
The need to assess and manage risk is an ongoing concern in our 
societies. As Stephen Townley put it, “[r]isk has become a preoccupation 
of states, businesses, and individuals,” which has come to be reflected in 
different areas of international law.6 This has changed our understanding 
of the role of international law in society. For example, there is an emer-
gent theory of “proactive law” that seeks broadly to “[shift] the focus of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Britta van Beers, Rewriting the Human Genome, Rewriting Human Rights Law? 
Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Germline Modification in the CRISPR Era, J. OF L. 
AND THE BIOSCIENCES (2020).   
 6. Stephen Townley, The Rise of Risk in International Law, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 594, 596 
(2018). 
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attention from dispute-resolution to . . . legal risk management.”7 The 
emerging approaches to risk in international law build on the principle of 
due diligence and the concept of due diligence obligations.8 As Timo Koi-
vurova noted, many fields of international law have seen  
the emergence of primary obligations that require States to ex-
ercise due diligence, that is, to endeavour to reach the result set 
out in the obligation. A breach of these obligations consists not 
of failing to achieve the desired result, but failing to take the 
necessary, diligent steps towards that end.9 
Due diligence obligations have their origin and have been advanced 
mostly in the field of international environmental law.10 Yet the same ob-
ligations extend to the protection of public health, even if the significance 
of these obligations has not received the same degree of wide interna-
tional legal attention as their significance in the field of environmental 
protection.11 A special branch of international law in which due diligence 
obligations have come to occupy an important place is international hu-
man rights law. As Frédéric Mégret explains, according to this body of 
law, the state needs to protect individuals from human rights violations.12 
This means that the state “needs to proactively ensure that persons within 
its jurisdiction do not suffer from human rights violations at the hands of 
third parties or even broad phenomena such as preventable environmental 
catastrophes.”13 In this context, the due diligence obligations have be-
come key for insisting that the state must enforce laws that require private 
actors, such as business enterprises, to respect human rights, and to pro-
vide an effective remedy for victims of human rights violations perpe-
trated by such actors.14 To be certain, the state is not responsible for all 
 
 7. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sustainable Develop-
ment, Business, and Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417, 438 (2015); see also George J. Siedel 
& Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L. J. 641, 656–
67 (2010). 
 8. Townley, supra note 6, at 598. 
 9. TIMO KOIVUROVA, Due Diligence, in OXFORD PUB. INTERNATIONAL LAW: MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 3 (2015). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Brigit Toebes, International Health Law: An Emerging Field of Public Interna-
tional Law, 55 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 299, 299–328 (2015). 
 12. FRÉDERIC MÉGRET, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 97 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 
2018). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY“ 
FRAMEWORK 3, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publica-
tions/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
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adverse interferences in individual rights by private actors,15 but the state 
is “liable for those failures that can be traced to its shortcomings in pro-
tecting individuals from others for example because it has adopted a law 
that made the violation possible, or because it has failed to do something 
that would have prevented the violation from happening.”16 In other 
words, the state is responsible for taking measures to prevent harm to the 
population, including those that private actors cause.17 
A recurrent theme in the field of biomedicine is the importance of 
risk assessment and management, including research, treatment and di-
agnostics affecting an individual’s genome. As expressed in the 
UNESCO Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights, which 
was adopted in 1997, “[r]esearch, treatment or diagnosis affecting an in-
dividual’s genome shall be undertaken only after rigorous and prior as-
sessment of the potential risks and benefits pertaining thereto and in ac-
cordance with any requirement of national law.”18 According to Article 
19 of the same declaration, “[i]n the framework of international co-oper-
ation with developing countries, states should seek to encourage 
measures enabling: (i) assessment of the risks and benefits pertaining to 
research on the human genome to be carried out and abuse to be pre-
vented.”19 In the more recent UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Hu-
man Rights that was adopted in 2005, the importance of risk assessment 
and management is reaffirmed.20 Specifically, the Declaration on Bioeth-
ics and Human Rights proclaims that “[a]ppropriate assessment and ade-
quate management of risk related to medicine, life sciences and associ-
ated technologies should be promoted.”21 
Having referred to these two declarations, the call for risk assess-
ment and management in research, treatment and diagnostics affecting an 
individual’s genome is not limited to public policy or what is sometimes 
referred to as soft law.22 Risk assessment and management has also been 
 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. MÉGRET, supra note 12, at 97–98 (citing X and Y v. The Netherlands 8 EHHR 235 (1986); 
Young, James and Webster v. UK 4 EHHR 38 (1982)). 
 17. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 14, at 3. 
 18. UNESCO 29 C/Res. 16, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 
art. 5(a) (Nov. 11, 1997) (endorsed by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1998 at its 53rd 
session) (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. art. 19(a) (emphasis added). 
 20. See UNESCO 33 C/Res. 36, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Humaxn Rights (Oct. 
19, 2005). 
 21. Id. art. 20; see also id. art. 7(b) (also mentioning risk). 
 22. See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in Inter-
national Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989); see also, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000). 
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integrated into and manifested in treaty law. A good example is the Coun-
cil of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Med-
icine (commonly referred to as the Oviedo Convention), which was 
adopted in 1997 and states that parties are obliged to assess and manage 
risk in different scenarios.23 In line with Article 16(ii), research on a per-
son may only be undertaken if several conditions are met, among them, 
that “the risks which may be incurred by that person are not dispropor-
tionate to the potential benefits of the research.”24 Furthermore, the need 
to assess risks and prevent possible harm is a central element of the EU 
Regulation on Clinical Trials, which mentions risk forty times.25 To illus-
trate: 
The assessment of [an] application for a clinical trial should ad-
dress in particular the anticipated therapeutic and public health 
benefits (relevance) and the risk and inconvenience for the sub-
ject. In respect [to] the relevance, various aspects should be 
taken into account, including whether the clinical trial has been 
recommended or imposed by regulatory authorities in charge of 
the assessment of medicinal products, and the authorization 
[provided before their] placing on the market, and whether sur-
rogate end-points, when they are used, are justified.26 
The outcome of a risk assessment may also have motivated, at least 
in part, the introduction of the rule included in Article 13 of the Oviedo 
Convention, which states, “An intervention seeking to modify the human 
genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic 
purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the 
genome of any descendants.”27 A risk assessment may also lie behind the 
formulation of Article 90 of the EU Regulation on Clinical Trials: “No 
gene therapy clinical trials may be carried out which result in modifica-
tions to the subject’s germline genetic identity.”28 Until the current risks 
 
 23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine art. 16, opened for signature Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S 
No. 164 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1999). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Regulation (EU) 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
14 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use and Repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, 
2014 O.J. (L 158) 1 [hereinafter Regulation (EU) 536/2014] (building on Recommendation of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the Governance of Clinical 
Trials of 10 December 2012, which introduces different risk categories for clinical trials). 
 26. Id. at recital 13. 
 27. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, supra note 23, art. 13. 
 28. Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 25, art. 90. 
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associated with clinical applications have been reduced, their presumed 
significance will lie at the heart of the recent global moratoriums on hu-
man germline editing for the purpose of creating genetically modified 
children.29 
As Eric Lander et al. pointed out, “[f]or germline editing to even be 
considered for clinical applications, its safety and efficacy must be suffi-
cient.”30 While techniques have improved in recent years, human 
germline interventions are still not seen as safe or effective enough to 
justify any use in the clinic.31 In particular, “the risk of failing to make the 
desired change or of introducing unintended mutations (off-target effects) 
is still unacceptably high.”32 Likewise, “[n]o clinical application of 
germline editing should be considered until its long-term biological con-
sequences [for individuals and the human species] are sufficiently under-
stood.”33 According to the drafters of the moratoriums on heritable gene 
editing, attempting to modify the risk of a common disease is fraught with 
challenges.34 It is also necessary to consider the risk that “the introduction 
of genetic modifications into future generations could have permanent 
and possibly harmful effects on the species.”35 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN RISK MANAGEMENT 
Whether or not precautionary measures, including the imposition of 
bans, are needed to reduce risks created by human activities has been de-
bated over decades. Now there is an upsurge of academic literature on 
this topic.36 This debate revolves around the question of whether or not to 
regulate a human activity that could potentially harm or damage the en-
vironment or human health, even if it is scientifically unclear what the 
probability that such harm or damage will actually occur and, if so, how 
 
 29. See, e.g., Joint Press Release of CCNE, DER, & NCOB, Joint Statement of Ethics Coun-
cils from France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Ethics of Human Germline Intervention, 
DEUTSCHER ETHIKRAT (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.ethikrat.org/en/press-releases/2020/joint-
statement-of-ethics-councils-from-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom-on-the-ethics-of-hu-
man-germline-intervention/ (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Joint Statement of Ethics 
Councils]. 
 30. Eric Lander et al., Adopt a Moratorium on Heritable Genome Editing, 567 NATURE 165, 
166 (2019). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 167. 
 36. See, e.g., Neil Pierce, Public Health and the Precautionary Principle, in THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN 49 (Marco Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner eds., 2004). 
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significant it would be.37 In a fundamental sense, the risks are 
“[u]nknown” in reference to the “potential peril about which we lack in-
formation either on the likelihood of the harm materializing or knowledge 
of the effect it would have if it did.”38 These scenarios thus differ from 
risks that are “known” because we are informed about the probability of 
occurrence of harm as well as the magnitude of the resulting harm.39 For 
example, the risk of allowing the disposal of toxic waste near people’s 
homes or allowing the contamination of drinking water is not only 
known, but has a high probability of causing significant harm, such as 
cancer.40 
The possible need for precaution in relation to activity that could 
potentially cause harm or damage to the environment or people’s health 
has led to the introduction and development of the precautionary princi-
ple.41 According to the European Commission, this principle is meant to 
guide regulators on whether or not to intervene in cases where “scientific 
information [about the risks involved] is insufficient, inconclusive, or un-
certain and where there are indications that the possible effects on the 
environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dan-
gerous.”42 It reflects the simple truism, “better safe than sorry.” As attrac-
tive as this guide may be, there is no agreement on how to interpret the 
principle.43 In fact, it has generated a whole array of different interpreta-
tions, some of which are at odds with international law. 
As Richard Stewart explains, the precautionary principle is open to 
a range of interpretations of what this principle actually means.44 Under 
the weakest interpretation, the principle asserts that “uncertainty regard-
ing the adverse environmental effects of an activity should not automati-
cally bar adoption of measures to prohibit or otherwise regulate the ac-
tivity.”45 In this light, it provides what seems to be a reasonable 
justification to not simply wait to regulate a human activity that may be 
harmful until there is conclusive, sufficient, and certain scientific 
 
 37. Id. at 49. 
 38. Townley, supra note 6, at 597. 
 39. Id. 
 40. E.g., R D Morris, Drinking Water and Cancer, 103 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS., 225 (1995). 
 41. See, e.g., Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109(9) 
ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS., 871 (2001). 
 42. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 7, COM (2000) 
1 final (Feb. 2, 2000). 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Richard Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, in 20 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 71 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002). 
 45. Id. at 71–72. 
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evidence about the existence of a risk that must be managed or mini-
mized. By contrast, under the strong interpretation, it asserts that “uncer-
tainty provides an affirmative justification for regulating an activity or 
regulating it more stringently than in the absence of uncertainty.”46 The 
strong interpretations of the principle encourage regulators to assess the 
risks of a human activity that could potentially cause significant harm in 
terms of “worst case” scenarios,47 which, according to the Cambridge 
Dictionary, refers to “the most unpleasant or serious thing that could hap-
pen in a situation.”48 For this reason, the strong version provides grounds 
for sweeping regulatory interventions, including bans, without consider-
ing the costs of regulating that activity, which are seen as irrelevant.49 
Based on this interpretation of the principle’s meaning, the burden of 
proof is reversed and those who wish to avoid regulation must provide 
the evidence that their activity is safe.50 
Both versions—weak or strong—are problematic since they can 
give rise to extreme and undesirable outcomes. At one extreme, the strong 
version risks legitimizing a policy that hinders scientific progress and ap-
plications of new technology.51 The strong version threatens to make so-
ciety too risk averse, which in turn may lead to paralysis.52 In comparison, 
the weak version of the principle seems rather unobjectionable.53 As Cass 
Sunstein explains, the weak version simply states a truism which in and 
by itself is “uncontroversial and necessary only to combat public confu-
sion or self-interested claims of private groups demanding unambiguous 
evidence of harm, which no rational society requires.”54 Indeed, insofar 
as the principle counteracts the tendency to demand certainty about risks, 
it is sound.55 Nevertheless, this version is problematic since it fails to pro-
vide clear guidance about whether or not to regulate a human activity that 
could potentially cause harm. It merely indicates that scientific uncer-
tainty about risk does not ‘automatically’ preclude regulation.56 
 
 46. Id. at 72. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Worst-case scenario, DICTIONARY.CAMBRIDGE.ORG, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/worst-case-scenario (last visited Jan. 3, 2021). 
 49. Stewart, supra note 44, at 72. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1035 
n.147 (2003). 
 52. Id. at 1020–28. 
 53. Id. at 1016. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1007. 
 56. Id. at 1014. 
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International law, which upholds the precautionary principle as a le-
gal one, does not resolve the problem of different interpretations, but ra-
ther it reproduces different versions.57 A weak version is found in the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), 
[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing …[precautionary] measures, taking into account that 
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest pos-
sible cost.58 
The so-called Wingspread Statement (1998) goes a bit further, de-
manding that “[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to human health 
or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”59 It 
also adds that “the proponent[s] of an activity, rather than the public, 
should bear the burden of proof” that it will not pose threats of harm to 
human health or the environment.60 
The Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 1992, instead 
expresses a strong version of the principle. According to the Convention, 
each state party shall, as far as possible: 
[e]stablish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the 
risks associated with the use and release of living modified or-
ganisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have 
adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into ac-
count the risks to human health.61 
Stronger versions of the principle are also at play in the field of EU 
law. The precautionary principle lies at the heart of many regulations and 
directives passed by the EU. It is recognized as a general principle of EU 
law, which is used not only to interpret acts, but also as a ground for the 
 
 57. According to international law scholars, the principle is not only treaty-based but also 
grounded in customary international law. See, e.g., Owen MacIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The 
Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law, 9 J. OF ENV’T. L. 221 (1997). 
 58. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, opened for signature 
June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).   
 59. Precautionary Principle: The Wingspread Statement, COLLABORATIVE ON HEALTH AND 
THE ENV’T, https://www.healthandenvironment.org/environmental-health/social-context/history/
precautionary-principle-the-wingspread-statement (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
 60. Id. 
 61. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological 
Diversity art. 8(g), opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 
29, 1993). 
TECH_TO_JCI 4/13/21  9:01 AM 
194 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:3 
invalidation of acts that contravene this principle.62 It is expressly en-
shrined in the context of environmental matters, which includes protect-
ing human health.63 Even if it is only mentioned explicitly in this context, 
the principle is broader in scope since it is also intended to ensure high 
levels of protection for health, consumer safety, and the environment in 
all of the EU’s spheres of activities.64 These goals translate into a require-
ment placed on competent authorities to take appropriate measures to pre-
vent specific potential risks to public health and safety, including food 
safety and the environment, by giving precedence to this requirement 
over economic interests.65 
As previously mentioned, there is no consensus on whether the prin-
ciple authorizes or requires regulatory intervention in risk scenarios, nor 
whether there are any methods to analyze or assess risk of harm in sce-
narios where there is no scientific certainty. There is also no formula to 
calculate the probability that harm will occur or to determine its magni-
tude. Indeed, there is no precise agreement on the meaning of the princi-
ple, not even within EU law, where it is acknowledged to be malleable.66 
A good example of this malleability is demonstrated in the judgment re-
lated to genetically modified organisms using CRISPR, which the EU 
Court of Justice decided in 2018.67 In the case, the court insisted that 
CRISPR posed potential risks for the environment or human health and 
therefore the EU directive concerning GMO was applicable.68 Yet the 
court’s interpretation contradicted the opinion of the Advocate General, 
who argued that CRISPR must be seen as excluded from the scope of the 
EU directive. In his words, “[a] mere fear of a risk induced by something 
new, or a vaguely and generally asserted risk of a risk where it cannot be 
conclusively stated that the new thing is safe, is an insufficient trigger for 
the precautionary principle.”69 
 
 62. PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 111 (6th 
ed. 2015). 
 63. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 191(1), 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 64. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 fi-
nal (Feb. 2, 2000), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0
001&from=EN; Case C-528/16, Confédération Paysanne v. Premier Minister, ¶¶ 49–53 (July 25, 
2018). 
 65. See id. at 49–53. 
 66. SCI. FOR ENV’T POL’Y, FUTURE BRIEF: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: DECISION-
MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4 (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/
newsalert/pdf/precautionary_principle_decision_making_under_uncertainty_FB18_en.pdf. 
 67. Case C-528/16, Judgment, CURIA. 
 68. Id. ¶ 60.  
 69. Case C-528/16, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, ECLI:EU:C:2018:20, ¶ 53 (Jan. 18, 
2018). 
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Be that as it may, the question raised in this article is if the precau-
tionary principle should guide decisions on how to regulate new biotech-
nology and, if so, what would it require. As we have seen, the principle 
is most immediately associated with and has thrived in the field of envi-
ronmental protection. It also extends to public health. As noted by Neil 
Pierce, “The primary goals of public health are preventing disease and 
promoting health in populations. The concepts of precaution and preven-
tion have therefore always been at the heart of public health practice.”70 
To date, exactly how the precautionary principle would influence the reg-
ulatory framework for clinical germline editing has not been examined 
with great detail. The few contributions on the topic seem to reproduce 
rather than resolve the disagreement about how the principle should be 
interpreted. 
Notably, Matthias Braun and Peter Dabrock stress that a core char-
acteristic of the precautionary-based approach is that it must not conflict 
with or prohibit innovation.71 As they put it, “[i]t lies within the precau-
tionary principle that precaution and innovation cannot be framed as op-
posing and mutually exclusive poles.”72 Therefore, any regulatory inter-
vention must acknowledge and reconcile these goals, as well as adjust to 
the fluid and dynamic nature of CRISPR as a biotechnological invention 
by resorting primarily to soft law instruments.73 According to another 
contribution, the principle recommends placing somewhat greater weight 
on avoiding threats to future generations than on achieving short-term 
benefits.74 At the same time, competing stances are also upheld. Harald 
König once said a moratorium on human germline editing could prevent 
states from adapting their regulatory frameworks to their own needs, in-
terests, values, ethical views and moral stances.75 To illustrate, in some 
societies, “the importance of having a genetically related child could out-
weigh the technology’s biological risks.”76 In other words, in his view, 
the risks involved are not sufficiently grave to outweigh the possible ben-
efits. A somewhat similar position stresses that a degree of uncertainty is 
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inherent in emerging biotechnological inventions and tools.77 In the end, 
it is a matter of determining when the technology is considered ‘safe 
enough’ to move along the translational pathway.78 
IV.  RECONCILING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS 
Those who downplay the significance of the risks of harm that could 
be caused by clinical applications of human germline editing tools stress 
the benefits that such applications could bring. Indeed, there are several 
potential beneficiaries of these kinds of interventions: the couples who 
want a genetically related child without passing on genetic disease as well 
as the child who will be born without such disease. As indicated by Bartha 
Knoppers and Erika Kleiderman, the calls for global moratoria on clinical 
applications of heritable genome editing are troubling since they do not 
foster the best interests for the health of children nor do they align with 
their right to benefit from the advancement of science.79 In a more long-
term perspective, the technology could potentially “endow children with 
‘protective’ genes that reduce the risk of common diseases, such as heart 
disease, cancer and diabetes,” which could potentially benefit not only 
the genetically modified children but also their descendants.80 Also, the 
Nuffield Council on Ethics stresses the potential benefits of the emerging 
tools to prevent medical diseases or disorders of future offspring.81 
From this perspective, a regulatory framework for scientific re-
search and possible future applications of human germline editing tools 
should be designed not merely to avert potential risks of harm. Such a 
framework may be consistent with and justified on the basis of existing 
legal obligations to act with due diligence and precaution. It may, how-
ever, not be compatible with the legal obligation to ensure respect, pro-
tection and fulfillment of human rights, including the rights to health, sci-
ence and scientific freedom. According to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to science entails the right 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. The same 
treaty says that states must undertake to “respect the freedom 
 
 77. Erika Kleiderman, Vardit Ravistky & Bartha Maria Knoppers, The ‘Serious’ Factor in 
Germline Modification, 45 J. OF MED. ETHICS 508, 510 (2019). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Bartha Knoppers & Erika Kleiderman, Heritable Genome Editing: Who Speaks for “Fu-
ture“ Children?, 2 CRISPR J., 285 (2019). 
 80. Koplin, supra note 74, at 50. 
 81. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON ETHICS, GENOME EDITING AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: 
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES (2018). 
TECH_TO_JCI 4/13/21  9:01 AM 
2020]   Human Rights Approach to Human Germline Editing Risks  197 
indispensable for scientific research.”82 Freedom of research is both indi-
vidual and collective, negative and positive. Individually, this freedom 
entails the right of everyone, including scientists and patients, to partici-
pate in the scientific enterprise. Collectively, it is the right of scientists to 
govern the scientific enterprise, including the right to self-regulation, but 
also a right to policies that support science, to research funding and infra-
structure.83 The covenant also states that the right to health is “the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health.”84 The right to health is especially stressed as a 
right of children. As proclaimed in the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989), state parties “recognize the right of the child 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facil-
ities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health,” which ex-
tends to the obligation of state parties to combat disease.85 
Even if the enjoyment of individual human rights can be restricted, 
any such restriction must be prescribed by law and “must be compatible 
with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”86 Pursuant to human rights doc-
trine, the promotion of the general welfare entails and legitimizes 
measures meant to protect different public goods, including public health 
and safety of the state’s population.87 At the same time, since such re-
strictions must be prescribed by law, they cannot be done arbitrarily.88 
Such restrictions must be “compatible with the nature of these rights,” 
which means that the core of the individual rights to health and science 
must be protected at all times.89 The compatibility requirement seems to 
pose significant restraints on regulatory decisions on how to manage risks 
of harm when the risks of harm are scientifically uncertain. Regulatory 
decisions are also restrained when the risks must be weighed against po-
tential benefits that would strengthen the protection and progressive 
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realization of human rights, including the rights to health and to science. 
In particular, strong versions of the precautionary principle when applied 
to managing risks that are scientifically uncertain and which must be 
weighed against benefits, seem incompatible with the protection of these 
rights. 
As noted in the General Comment no. 25 of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the application of the precaution-
ary principle “is sometimes controversial, particularly in relation to sci-
entific research itself, as limitations on the freedom of scientific research 
are compatible with the Covenant only in the circumstances set out in 
article 4.”90 Nevertheless, this principle “is more broadly applied for the 
use and application of scientific outcomes.”91 Therefore, it “should not 
hinder and prevent scientific progress, which is beneficial for humanity“92 
In this light, this principle does not and should not hinder continued sci-
entific research aimed at improving genome editing tools in order to re-
duce the current risks of harm associated with clinical applications of 
such tools. Considering the potential benefits to the right to health, state 
parties must “Ensure access to those applications of scientific progress 
that are critical to the enjoyment of the right to health and other economic, 
social and cultural rights.93 
When it comes to the question whether or not future clinical appli-
cations of genome editing tools are consistent with a human rights frame-
work it must first of all be recalled that individual rights and freedoms 
are often at play in decision-making on risks, “decision-makers are con-
stantly faced with the dilemma of balancing the freedom and rights of 
individuals, industry and organisations with the need to reduce the risk of 
adverse effects to the environment, human, animal or plant health.”94 De-
spite this, those who discuss what measures must be taken do not neces-
sarily consider the range of individual rights and freedoms that come un-
der pressure as a result of these decisions. 
International human rights law ordinarily generates three types of 
obligations. Firstly, there is the duty to respect human rights, which es-
sentially refers to a negative obligation not to take any measures that re-
sults in a violation of a given right. Secondly, there is the duty to protect 
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human rights, which requires states to provide health care and education 
to their populations and safeguard the benefits from scientific progress 
and developments for everyone. The latter presupposes that states are 
willing not only to allocate resources and invest in science, including in-
novation, but also to integrate the results of scientific progress into 
healthcare and educational settings. Finally, there is the duty to fulfill hu-
man rights, which means that the state is obliged to take positive steps 
that lead to the greater enjoyment of rights. Even if all rights generate 
duties to protect and fulfill additional economic, social and scientific 
rights, these are paradigmatic of rights that the state can hardly guarantee 
unless it actively adopts legislative and other measures to protect and ful-
fill them.95 
From a human rights standpoint, individual rights and freedoms do 
not function as mere side-constraints on the democratic decision-making 
of how to manage risks. That is, such rights and freedoms do not merely 
limit the scope and subject matter of such decisions. Rather, rights will 
also guide and inform such decision-making.96 Despite this, those who 
discuss what measures must be taken do not necessarily consider the 
range of individual rights and freedoms that come under pressure as a 
result of these decisions. This is so since the question of how to guarantee 
a particular right, such as to health or to science, can require the allocation 
of resources and investments in scientific research on new technology 
that can strengthen the protection and progressive fulfilment of these 
rights. Therefore, any decision-making on whether or not to invest in fu-
ture scientific research on human germline editing must consider and 
weigh the importance of protecting people and future generations from 
the impact of potentially harmful technology, even if the effects of that 
technology are uncertain. It furthermore requires protecting people from 
decisions that effectively prevent or deprive them from benefiting from 
emerging technology that has the potential of significantly improving the 
enjoyment of their right to health. In controversial cases, such as clinical 
human germline editing, a human rights approach stresses the importance 
of participation and transparency. Both the risks and the potential of ge-
nome editing tools “should be made public in order to enable society, 
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through informed, transparent and participatory public deliberation, to 
decide whether or not the risks are acceptable.”97 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Whatever decisions are made on the future regulation of human 
germline editing, whether as a field of scientific research or as an emerg-
ing technology with benefits for human health, it must be in line with a 
series of legal obligations. These obligations entail both acting with due 
diligence and precaution as well as with respect to protect and fulfill hu-
man rights. Per international human rights law, rights can be restricted if 
deemed necessary to promote the general welfare of society, including 
for the sake of protecting the health and safety of populations writ large. 
At the same time, the core significance of each human right, including to 
health, must be protected and reconciled with measures to prevent risks 
of harm. 
The precautionary principle provides an important justification for 
regulating activities that pose significant risk of harm to the environment 
and public health, even if there is no scientific certainty about the proba-
bility that harm will actually occur or how grave it will be. From a legal 
standpoint, in its weak version, it clarifies that the state may well act with 
due diligence and precaution in the context of scientific uncertainty. In 
its strong versions, the principle not only permits but requires states to 
make risk assessments and even to impose sweeping bans. A strong read-
ing of the principle, however, comes into conflict with human rights ob-
ligations generated by the right to science and rights of scientists. A so-
ciety that mainly cares for due diligence and precaution will end up 
stifling scientific freedom and, as a result, scientific progress, which is a 
condition for the progressive realization of the right to health. Against 
this background, it is concluded that the precautionary principle—as val-
uable as it might be in a society that struggles with environmental degra-
dation and climate change—must not be interpreted in such a way that it 
impedes continued scientific progress aimed at developing new tools that 
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